Last chance for peace

No zero-sum games at Agra Last chance for peace

NAJAM SETHI

GENERAL Pervez Musharraf is all set to visit India. In the last two weeks, he has obtained the support of most sections of public opinion to go ahead and talk to India with an open mind on how to resolve the simmering dispute over Kashmir. But most critically, the ISI, which destabilised Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif when they didn’t see eye to eye with it on how to deal with India, is backing him to the hilt. Indeed, to all intents and purposes, Musharraf heads a military government in which former ISI big-guns hold sway. Does this mean he has the mandate to clinch a deal with India?

The ironies in the situation should be noted. Pakistan’s top three political parties — Bhutto’s PPP, Sharif’s PML-N and Altaf Hussain’s MQM — have chosen to spurn Musharraf. All were once proponents of peace with India. But all are critical of the latest diplomatic initiatives. They have chosen to put party political interests above the national interest because Musharraf has hounded them to the wall and excluded them from political discourse.

More surprisingly, among the many newspaper editors who support Musharraf’s visit to India are many who vigorously opposed Bhutto and Sharif when they hinted at ‘‘flexibility’’, the buzzword these days. Equally, among the religious groups and parties which are now backing Musharraf are many with overt or covert links to the jehadi forces in Kashmir.

Equally interesting is the government’s disdainful attitude towards two former DGs-ISI, General Hameed Gul and General Javed Nasir, both born-again Islamicist hardliners. Neither was ‘‘invited’’ to meet Musharraf. It may also be recalled that on June 5, Musharraf had criticised the jehadi organisations for their lack of accountability over jehad funds and for empty anti-India braggadocio. Only a man squarely in control can express such sentiments and get away with it. The message that he is sending to India is this: he can rein in the jehadis in Kashmir if and when the situation so warrants. And that will be his strong card at the Agra summit.

But Benazir Bhutto has now stepped into the fray and tried to muddy the waters. She says Musharraf hasn’t changed his spots, that he’s only seeking to deflect international pressure, that he has no mandate to make a deal with India, that India is making a colossal mistake in talking to him and that it will all end up in a puff of smoke. Is she right?

Yes and no. It is true that, for various obvious reasons, Musharraf desperately wants the world to look upon him kindly. But it is equally true that Vajpayee doesn’t want to stick out like a sore thumb. Of course, the weight of history is set against any ‘‘historic breakthroughs’’. But we should forget about questions of ‘‘mandate’’. When Bhutto had the mandate, she became a warmonger. And when Sharif had it, he screwed it up royally. At any rate, if she and Sharif are pro-peace, as they claim, they might reconsider their views about the latest initiatives. The fact is Musharraf has gone the extra mile to solicit and obtain more domestic support for his trip to India than any Pakistani leader since Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1972.

But the hype on both sides is intriguing. Given past experience, this should have been avoided. However, Musharraf and Vajpayee seem oblivious of its potentially adverse consequences. Either some interlocutors have secretly held out unprecedented assurances to both sides or we are about to start whistling in the dark again. Perhaps the truth lies somewhere in between.

Certainly, there has been a logical progression in the whole affair. The Hizbul Mujahideen’s ceasefire last year was followed by India’s ceasefires; the LOC was duly quietened down and the Hurriyat Conference was given to understand that it would be brought into the loop sooner or later. Indeed, when India finally decided not to permit Hurriyat leaders to visit Pakistan early this year, it was already clear that a meeting between Musharraf and Vajpayee was on the cards. The two high commissioners seemed to all but publicly confirm it. The latest moves by both sides — India’s war games and an end to the ceasefire in Kashmir coupled with Pakistan’s insistence that the core issue of Kashmir would be addressed — were only meant to buttress each side’s negotiating position.

Now Musharraf wants India to permit the Hurriyat leaders to meet him. But India doesn’t seem terribly keen on the idea. The logic of this refusal is not clear, especially when there is a precedent — they were allowed to meet Pakistani President Farooq Leghari when he visited New Delhi in 1995 for the SAARC summit. Also, if India wants Musharraf to rein in the jehadis, it should enable him to buttress the Hurriyat Conference for negotiations with K.C. Pant or any other representative of New Delhi. This suggests that the pre-talks Pakistani demand and Indian refusal have already become part of the proposed negotiations, and one shouldn’t be surprised if the meeting eventually transpires in the Pakistan high commission in New Delhi. After all, if both sides are smiling for the world’s cameras, how can the Kashmiris, the truly aggrieved party, be kept out of the picture?

The truth is that both have to show flexibility on Kashmir. India’s view of Pakistan may be that of a deadbeat state now desperate to sign on the dotted line. But Pakistan has the bomb and Musharraf can bleed India in Kashmir for some time to come. New Delhi should also realise that Agra is not Shimla. The fact is that if ‘‘deadbeat Pakistan’’ actually goes under as some Indians would like, India and Pakistan will be at the receiving end of jehad like never before. Therefore neither can afford to stick to the status quo.

The contours of the long-term solution to Kashmir are obvious enough. With minor amendments, both countries would retain what they have already got, so that neither loses anything, while the Kashmiris in the Valley obtain ‘‘maximum freedom minus secession’’ from India. But it is the short-term which is problematic, given inflamed passions and vested interests all round. That is why we should be happy even with small beginnings.

At the least, a three-way process of talking about a solution to Kashmir should be institutionalised at the summit while both India and Pakistan go about mending fences on less contentious issues (like Siachen, LOC, CBMs, etc) and the Hurriyat Conference is brought into the political loop. In other words, the summit would be a ‘‘success’’ if all three sides emerge winners from it. Anything more than that should not be expected. And anything less than that should not be acceptable. Past experience suggests that the price of failure would be another bloody round of conflict which no one can afford.

(Najam Sethi is editor of ‘The Friday Times’, Lahore)