Win-win or love-all?

Though policy experts aren’t placing bets on the summit, they aren’t writing it off either

SONIA TRIKHA

THE India-Pakistan summit must not fail, is the message from academics and intellectuals around the world. From Tokyo to Cleveland to Moscow and Oslo, the eyes of the people will be on the summit headlines next week. Yet, no one is willing to bet their pension it will succeed.

What’s agreed upon, however, is that Kashmir must not be allowed to hold the summit to ransom. Any attempt to limit the agenda to Kashmir will guarantee the failure of the first talks between India and Pakistan since the Kargil war in the summer of 1999.

Defining the success or failure of talks can be tricky. Stephen P. Cohen of Brookings Institution defines a (marginal) success as an agreement that provides ‘‘face-saving devices’’ for both countries, but especially Pakistan. ‘‘Both sides get to take ‘home’ with them enough to justify the event in the first place, and make further dialogue politically palatable in their own country,’’ says Cohen.

For most, determining the outcome of India-Pakistan talks is a science less exact than weather gazing. So Charles H. Norchi, an international security expert at Yale Law School, limits himself to calling for ‘‘reducing tensions’’ between the two nations to justify the summit. Already, the spiral of tensions between nuclear-powered India and Pakistan is reminiscent of the Cold War. ‘‘It is a reminder that some cold wars have not ended,’’ says Norchi.

But the resumption of negotiations is itself being seen as a positive development for the region. From there on, it is uncharted territory but most people recommend taking the Lahore bus route again.
Shirin Tahir-Kheli of Johns Hopkins University points to the Track-II initiative BALUSA’s recommendations which call for Agra to be a Lahore Plus summit. This means it will get the Pakistani military finally on board the Lahore process. Pakistan may not agree to simply restate all aspects of the Lahore meeting of February 1999 (given criticism that it had downplayed Kashmir) but a formulation allowing for the principles of that meeting could provide an opening. ‘‘A statement by General Musharraf to the Indian people that Pakistan wanted to live in peace and friendship with India would go down well as had the visit of Mr. Vajpayee to the Minar-e-Pakistan during his Lahore journey in February 1999.’’

Samina Yasmeen at the University of Western Australia says, in actual terms, this could mean a statement acknowledging that the situation in Kashmir needs to be addressed by both sides and that wishes of all Kashmiris (not just Muslim Kashmiris) are important in this context. In the meanwhile, both parties must declare that other issues could be addressed.

Other issues, academics argue, could include nuclear risk reduction measures, improved trade and cultural links. Popularly understood as Confidence Building Measures, they involve smaller agreements on visas, cricket and so on. Other suggestions include troop reductions along the LoC, even Siachen, as well as a statement that the leaders recognise energy needs of their respective countries and hope of future cooperation in the area.

But most intellectuals are only aware that the reality of Kashmir is likely to dominate talks. Cohen recommends that the pitfalls of failure could be avoided here. For the Pakistanis, something on Kashmir could mean a ‘‘recognition that it is the central (but not only) issue, and some palliative steps regarding the life of the Kashmiris themselves, plus a long-term dialogue pointing towards the future’’. For the Indians, some reduction in Pakistani efforts to embarrass India over Kashmir on the international scene could go a long way in rescuing peace talks.

Tahir-Kheli calls for some forward movement on Kashmir, even if it is a statement that the two leaders are agreed on embarking on the ‘‘long journey to find a solution’’.

It is important that the impression not be that there was a quick solution. However, equally important is some forward movement in order to demonstrate that the two sides had gone beyond Kargil.
As for the western audience, especially the US which is being seen as a major force in bringing the two sides to the table, Cohen says, ‘‘For both sides, even the appearance of an agreement will be helpful in their relations with the US, and they could make a joint argument that nuclear sanctions are counterproductive, especially if they can agree on a few CBMs or even move on Siachen.’’ Norchi describes the summit as being of ‘‘overwhelming’’ importance for the US and every policy person will be watching the weekend summit closely.

And the question that everyone will be asking is, can it really work? Yasmeen’s observation is that the manner in which Pakistan Government is handling the situation indicates an internal contradiction in its approach. On the one side, it realises the need to negotiate with India. (There is a clear difference in Pakistan’s previous mantra of a plebiscite and the current emphasis on some settlement on Kashmir. There are also references to nuclear risk reduction measures, which indicate that the military government accepts the logic of the Lahore Declaration.)

On the other hand, Pakistan seems to be chanting a one-word mantra: Kashmir. ‘‘In my view, there is a danger in this obsession with the ‘centrality of the Kashmir issue’. If it is identified as the only route through which any future normalisation can continue, the results of the summit may not be very positive.’’

Both leaders will need to present the understandings in terms of a win-win result and be careful not to undermine chances of future discussions by presenting them in zero-sum terms. Any attempt by either of the two to project itself as the winner could be counterproductive. ‘‘In Pakistan, ordinary citizens seem sceptical and are wondering if Musharraf is going to ‘get a down payment on Kashmir’ with the ultimate objective of ‘selling out to India’,’’ says Yasmeen. The summit must not reinforce that impression. Cohen has the last word: I expect that this minimum will be achieved, but I would not bet my pension on it.