Adviser raj

The steel frame can do without appendages

J N DIXIT

Of late the Government of India has been appointing what I call ‘‘supernumerary’’ advisers in the ministries of defence and external affairs. This is apart from extensions beyond the age of 60 to a number of officials and appointment of retired officers from the services to ambassadorial posts. I undertake a critical evaluation of this practice only in institutional terms. I have nothing against the individuals who have been assigned these responsibilities. In fact, most of them are personal friends I hold in high esteem.

Former foreign secretaries Lalit Man Singh and Raghunath have been posted to Washington and Moscow, respectively, as ambassadors. K.V. Rajan, till recently secretary (east), and S.K. Lambah, about to retire as our envoy to Moscow, have been appointed as advisers to the ministry of external affairs. Arun Singh functions as special adviser in the ministries of defence and external affairs with the rank of minister of state. Cabinet Secretary Prasad has been given an extension, as were two previous foreign secretaries, Salman Haidar and Raghunath.

The question arises whether there is any need, any special circumstance, which compels the government to give extensions, appoint advisers or to re-employ officers who have retired. There is added relevance to these questions given the large number of people who have been so deployed compared to previous times. Lest one is accused of indulging in instant critical value judgements, one would examine the reasons why special advisers were appointed in our government. Previous precedents have functional and procedural implications for the current crop of advisers.

Over the last 50 years, advisers were appointed in the government for specific short-term objectives or functions. In fact, with the creation of the post of principal secretary to the PM by Lal Bahadur Shastri and its institutionalisation, the need for advisers stood diminished. Besides, none of the advisers had an institutional role in the functioning of Union ministries, nor were they given responsibilities which would intrude into or erode the role of the regular civil service functionaries. They dealt with specific tasks and departed when the work was over.

The practice of giving extensions to civil servants commenced only in the late ’70s. Till then extensions were rare and infrequent. Individuals selected for the senior-most posts generally had a minimum of two or three years time. The frequency of extensions was a result of the vested political interests of ministers and politicians and administrative timidity about appointing officers to senior posts on the basis of competence and merit without the illogical hesitations about superceding officers who were not as competent as those who deserved to be given higher responsibilities when they still had sufficient time in service.

The current practice of appointing advisers, especially over the last three years, has nothing to do with previous precedents or functional terms of reference of advisers being appointed for specific short-term objectives. The procedural and functional implications are equally questionable. First, advisers have been designated without any specific details about their responsibilities. Secondly, it is not clear whether they are advisers to the ministries or the minister concerned. Third, there is no jurisdictional definition of subjects they are supposed to deal with.

The institutional implications of the posting of advisers is equally worrisome. Appointing advisers, particularly from within the services themselves post-retirement, implies that ministers do not have sufficient confidence in their secretaries and senior functionaries. It implies that the prime minister and the ministers concerned do not consider the advice of the foreign secretary, defence secretary and other secretaries sufficiently competent, thoughtful and thorough. Moreover, does the presence of special security adviser Arun Singh imply that the advice from the service chiefs and the chiefs of intelligence organisations and national security advisory board is not adequate? Would it not have been more appropriate to have the convener of the NSAB as special security adviser if there was need for an addition to the role played by the national security adviser? If the present convener of the NSAB is not sufficiently acceptable, would it not have been more appropriate to entrust Arun Singh with that institutional responsibility?

I would add on the basis of 36 years of government service that the presence of advisers, particularly when they are senior to the secretaries in the ministries in terms of years of service and status, erodes the institutional authority and functional cohesion of the ministries concerned. The significance and functional relevance of the permanent secretaries to the ministries diminishes if there is a surfeit of advisers dealing with subjects which are the functional responsibilities of secretaries and their senior subordinates. The presence of advisers also results in disruption of the chain of command and confusion in operational terms.

As far as giving extensions and appointing retired foreign service officers to ambassadorships are concerned, the government should keep in mind the fact that each time a retired officer is posted, it is depriving a regular service officer who does not lack seniority and experience for the post. It also implies that the government does not consider the upcoming generation of officers sufficiently qualified or competent. This certainly is not the case. Secondly, the necessity of giving extensions can be overcome if the government selects competent officers with sufficient time left in service for them to hold senior-most posts for a fixed tenure. This would involve supercession, which according to government rules is completely permissible for the selection grades in our superior civil services.

It is significant that in a recent meeting on this subject a number of ministers did not want senior posts to have a fixed tenure because they felt it would diminish their control over the bureaucracy. Short tenures and reward of possible extensions are methods by which ministers want to control and influence bureaucrats, diminishing or preventing their capacity to give independent and fearless advice — proof enough that personal power is more important to certain segments of our political leadership.

Should this be the basis on which we predicate the stability and functional efficiency of our country? To my mind, certainly not. It is time for a special endeavour to revert back to applying the basic principles and institutional terms of our Constitution in the governance of the country.