Battle against history

Next time avoid the bright lights and ticking clocks

AJAI SHUKLA

THE circumstances surrounding the Pakistani delegation’s midnight departure for Islamabad — unreal expectations of personal chemistry, unsurprising disappointment, and a stampede by demanding presspersons — encapsulated what was played out over three days during the Agra Summit. In light of the great hope that many people had invested in it, the summit seemed a colossal failure, but in fact it has provided both a beginning for eventual reconciliation, and a reality check for those who imagine that simply getting two leaders to sit down together can erase 50 years of bitterness.

It seems clear that both leaders came into the summit with the will and the intention to make a success of it. General Musharraf, who morphed into President Musharraf during the run-up to the summit, had the higher stakes in striking a deal. He seeks international legitimacy, which he may achieve by resolving what is increasingly viewed as a nuclear flashpoint. A perceived transformation from usurper to statesman would ease the economic pressure which is interfering with his regime’s developmental and military expenditure and day-to-day governance. Domestically, that would elevate him over politicians who have previously failed in this enterprise, and secure him against army cohorts who lurk in the wings, waiting for him to make a mistake. And it would justify his hard line against Pakistani fundamentalist parties whom he confronted head-on during the run-up to the summit. Unfortunately, if he made any concessions without clear-cut parallel concessions from India, his domestic audience would crucify him.

Prime Minister Vajpayee came into the summit with far less pressure on him. If he harbours any wish to be perceived as a statesman, it is a personal goal rather than an imperative for political survival. Contrary to Pakistani popular opinion, India did not come into the summit under severe pressure from militant groups. India already holds most of Jammu and Kashmir. It is viewed as a responsible state, a regional power, and a budding US strategic partner. To make matters worse for Pakistan, India seized the moral high ground by taking the initiative for the summit. While resolving the Kashmir issue would certainly free India from the South Asian context and allow it to move towards its Great Power dream, what must have been more apparent to Vajpayee was the political downside of conceding too much to Pakistan.

In framing the agenda for the discussion, each leader chose a method reflective of his past. Vajpayee, a man of long political experience, chose to adopt India’s longst- tanding ploy of diluting the Kashmir issue in a mixture of less contentious issues. He sent specific proposals to Islamabad to frame an agenda for a wide-ranging dialogue, ‘‘encompassing the totality of relations between the two countries’’, to quote Jaswant Singh’s favourite phrase. Musharraf, briefed by the Pakistani establishment that India always diverts attention away from Kashmir by focusing on other issues, chose the path of a general: to concentrate on Kashmir, and Kashmir alone.

Musharraf’s background also determined his insistence upon a one-on-one interaction with Vajpayee with an unstructured agenda. As a general with a forceful personality and the experience of always being able to push through what he believes is logical and correct, He expected to persuade his counterpart to ‘‘see the light’’. His surprise at not being able to do so was very evident from his bewildered tone when talking about ‘‘the main issue’’ during his breakfast interaction with the press.

The single most important goal for each country must have been apparent to the other. For India, it was an end to cross-border terrorism, a pre-requisite for the return of normalcy to Jammu and Kashmir. To accede to this, however, Pakistan would have to cut the ground from under its own feet. The only real bargaining leverage that Pakistan wields in J&K is through its proxies, the jehadi groups operating in the state. Removing support to these groups would quickly destroy them, leaving Pakistan with no choice but to take whatever India sees fit to give. For Pakistan, therefore, cross-border terrorism had to be retained as a lever until the end of the peace process. Its own demand was that India recognise Kashmir as a ‘‘dispute’’ or ‘‘issue’’, which must be settled ‘‘in accordance with the wishes of the Kashmiri people’’. The problem is that Pakistan was unwilling to concede what India wanted in return — an end to cross-border terrorism.

The rhetoric flowing from Islamabad and Delhi made it clear that both leaders recognised the need to make a bold departure from the frozen positions of the past. Both sides waxed eloquent on the need for statesmanship and a spirit of give and take. However, both leaders are politically too insecure to be able to concede to the other side as much as will make a solution feasible. While Vajpayee’s constraints as the leader of a coalition government with differing views even within his own party are no secret, Musharraf’s vulnerability was dramatically revealed in his comment about buying back the Neharwali Haveli rather than returning to Pakistan without addressing the Kashmir problem forcefully.

The summit conclusively demonstrated that emotional symbolism is no substitute for painstaking diplomatic groundwork, preparing realistic options to address the concerns of both sides. In the absence of a bold and attractive proposition from either side, the summit was inevitably reduced to semantic wrangling over the framing of a joint statement that could salvage some respectability from what are essentially irreconcilable positions. That this had to be done against a deadline, and in the context of a media sniping campaign, doomed the attempt to failure.

The media’s role has come under scrutiny, particularly after Musharraf used it as a tool to pressurise India and demonstrate his commitment to Kashmir to his domestic audience. The Indian response was slow to come, but Jaswant Singh was measured and dignified in his repudiation of ‘‘negotiations through the press’’. The press certainly cannot be wished away, but it is also instructive to remember that the Israeli-Egyptian problem, an equally intractable issue, was resolved far from the media glare, at Camp David. A similar format might prove worthwhile when the two leaders next meet.

If the summit did not result in an Agra Declaration or even an Agra Statement, it did bring together not only both leaders, but also other people associated with the summit. The Pakistani media has been exposed to the freedom and vibrancy of their Indian counterparts, Track Two diplomacy continues, and people-to-people interaction will be stepped up by easing restrictions on travel and border crossing.

The writer is a defence analyst with NDTV