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Beijing
to Kargil to Agra
Weary travellers and unsuccessful diplomats
MANI
SHANKAR AIYAR
NEVER
before in half a century of independence has Indian diplomacy
faced humiliation comparable to what the country has had to
endure this last week. Setbacks we have known; lack of success
in carrying conviction we have known; failure we have known.
But never before has our national self-respect received the
kind of body-blow the Indian prime minister invited upon himself
at Agra.
Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s fatal flaw is that he is not a statesman
but a poet, not a diplomatist but a qawwal. He thinks international
relations is about a fine turn of phrase. The only reason
his forays into foreign policy might be commended is that
he was the first to speak in Hindi at the United Nations.
Beyond that his is a dismal record of disaster after disaster
in diplomacy. One cannot even begin to understand what went
wrong at Agra without travelling back in time some two decades
to 1977-79 when Vajpayee was external affairs minister in
the Morarji Desai cabinet. His overweening desire was to use
his portfolio as the launching pad to prove that what the
Congress could not do, he, Houdini Vajpayee, was capable of
doing. Therefore, since India-China relations had been in
deep freeze for two decades, Vajpayee planned his historic
breakthrough to the Forbidden Capital.
One
cannot even begin to understand what went wrong at Agra
without travelling back in time to 1977-79 when Vajpayee
was external affairs minister
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Nothing
much wrong with that. Except that he took no account of what
the Chinese were up to elsewhere. That was no closely guarded
state secret. The spat between the Chinese and the Vietnamese
was at its height. The murderous Pol Pot was rampaging over
Cambodia, undertaking the most vicious genocide known to humankind,
a mass killing that eventually took the lives of one-third
of his own people. Pol Pot’s most ardent supporter was Beijing,
a Beijing infuriated because all that stood between Pol Pot
and the massacre of every man, woman and child in Cambodia
was the Vietnamese. The Vietnamese had entered their neighbouring
country to halt Pol Pot in his tracks. The Chinese were not
amused. Everyone who knew anything at all about foreign affairs,
down to the meanest clerk in South Block, knew that a major
armed confrontation was but a matter of time, the world-record
worst moment to schedule any breakthrough journey to the People’s
Republic. But because Vajpayee knows nothing of world affairs
(and everything about securing headlines) he went ahead.
In fairness to him, I should add that he brushed aside contrary
advice also because the sands of time were running out: the
Morarji government was in its death throes and, therefore,
it was Beijing or Bust. He went. Hardly had he touched down
that China decided it was the right moment to send troops
across the border into Vietnam. A full-scale war broke out
while our friend bit his nails on the other side of the border
from Hong Kong. Left with no alternative, Vajpayee aborted
his mission and took flight to New Delhi. It was, at the time,
the most naive exercise in diplomacy ever undertaken by an
Indian external affairs minister.
The contrast with Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to China a decade later
is telling. Almost the minute he took over as prime minister,
Rajiv Gandhi decided that the restoration of a measure of
normalcy in India-China relations was a compelling requirement.
I was on the fringes of the PMO team led by Gopi Arora which
made the preparations. Gopi’s office was littered with files
dating back to the MacMahon Line agreement of 1914 and before.
For four solid years, every possible angle was explored. At
the prime minister’s level two decisions were taken which
only he could take. The first: to push an eyeball-to-eyeball
military confrontation with the Chinese army at Sumdorongchu
where we had apprehended a Chinese intrusion. It was the Chinese
who blinked. Thus 1962 was consigned to history. Then came
the February 1987 grant of full statehood to Arunachal Pradesh,
notwithstanding the anticipated squawk from Beijing, indeed
with every intention of signalling the People’s Republic that
every inch of Arunachal was Indian, whatever the Chinese might
think.
Thereafter, and only thereafter, were dates discussed for
the visit to China. It was no coincidence that visits to both
China and Pakistan were scheduled in the same month of December
1988. Everything was prepared down to the last detail before
Rajiv Gandhi embarked for Beijing. Everything, therefore,
went without a glitch. The one thing not planned for was Deng
Xiaoping’s handshake before the cameras of the world in the
Great Hall of the People. It went on and on and on. Every
television viewer everywhere in the world was informed that
the era of confrontation was over, the era of cooperation
had begun. A decade later, the reverberations of that handshake
are still echoing in the chancelleries of the world. That
is what summits between adversaries should be about.
Vajpayee does not understand this. Twice in two years he has
scheduled summits with Pakistan with little or no preparation.
He is truly an old man in a hurry. He pushed the Lahore Yatra
knowing that if he delayed, Jayalalitha would topple his government.
He, therefore, made no preparations, not even responding to
the 17 different warning signals identified by the K. Subrahmanyam
Kargil Review Committee. A week before the visit, I was in
Islamabad and Lahore with a parliamentary delegation which
included that electronic Barbie doll, the always meretricious
Sushma Swaraj, and it was as clear as the sound of the azaan
that this was no way to prepare a critical summit. For it
was while we were there that the Pakistanis told the Indian
high commissioner there would be no Bus to Lahore, only a
few yards into Pakistani territory up to the Wagah check-post
and then by helicopter to Lahore because there was no other
way the Pakistan government could guard the Indian prime minister
from the wrath of some Pakistanis. Hence, Kargil.
Now for a second time, his final term as prime minister under
sentence of political death, Vajpayee has invited upon himself
yet another disastrous summit. The 13 dead pilgrims at Amarnath
have to be added to the 500 martyrs of Kargil as the price
in blood this country has had to pay for Vajpayee’s hopelessly
premature attempts to secure a Nobel prize for peace.
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